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Miguel Vatter*
Étienne Balibar, Jacques Rancière and Axel Honneth are representative figures of a
generation of political theorists who stand under the shooting star of May 1968, the high
season of insurrectionary politics in the last half century. The books under review offer a
welcome opportunity to consider the lessons they draw from this event and its aftermath at
the twilight of their careers. However, taken as a whole these books also reveal the limits
of this style of radical democratic theory that only in a very approximate way has registered
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the passing of the baton, which occurred roughly during the same period, between a politics
aiming at emancipation and a politics of governmentality or biopolitics.
The two books by Balibar reflect a prolific writing career that has touched on
nearly every conceivable topic and author of significance in European political and social
theory. Thankfully, these two slim volumes focus their attention on two problems,
citizenship and violence, which can be considered to be focal points of his oeuvre in
general. In this sense, and in conjunction, the books allow the reader to grasp the main
points of Balibar’s political thought without needing to wade through the gargantuan
collection of essays and lectures which has recently been published in French, much of
which has now also been translated into English. 1
Citizenship is an agile little book that showcases one of the best traits of Balibar
as a theorist, namely, the panoramic approach he brings to any topic, characterized by an
effort to address as many pertinent discourses or perspectives as possible. In this sense, this
book serves well as a concise yet not superficial theoretical introduction to the idea of
citizenship, both from a historical perspective and in light of many current debates. The
main thesis is that the concept of citizenship is torn between two possible meanings, both
derivative of the Greek term ‘politeia’ which Balibar translates as “constitution of
citizenship” and interprets by following Aristotle’s definitions of the term (12). On one
meaning of the term, ‘politeia’ refers to the condition in which citizens “rotate between
different positions of power [and] exercize an aoristos arche, an indefinite office… which
makes them the ‘sovereigns’ or ‘masters’ of the community” (13). In this first meaning,
citizenship requires democracy. On another meaning of politeia, the very rotation of offices
denotes a legal constitution which refers to an underlying normative order or nomos (13).
In this second meaning, citizenship requires a constitutional form of government.
Sometimes Balibar speaks of the tension that is constitutive of citizenship in terms of the
distinction between a constituent and a constituted power; more often, he speaks of a
“dialectic of insurrection and constitution” (37, 55, 117).
At the heart of this dialectic stands another crucial principle employed by Balibar,
namely, the idea of aequa libertas or, in his own coinage, “equaliberty” (29ff). This
principle states that the rights or liberties guaranteed to citizens under a certain
constitutional arrangement, viz. constitution, ought to be extended equally to those who are
not included in the politeia as legal order, but who performatively exercise the aoristos
arche of citizenship through their demands for universal rights, viz. insurrection (31–33).
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One of the main problems with this thesis is that in Balibar the “dialectic” between
insurrection and constitution heavily leans on the side of insurrection. As he says at the end
of the book: “insurrection… is the active modality of citizenship: the modality that brings
it into action” (131). In this sense, one gets the impression that for Balibar citizenship is
not merely an artificial status that is unthinkable apart from nomos or a substantive
normative order, but somehow also denotes a potential that is immanent in the human
species. How one is to think this claim is not said. But the priority assigned to insurrection
over constitution has one important downside, namely, that it leaves nearly untouched the
on-going debate on constituent power started last century by Kelsen and Schmitt, where,
contra Balibar, the prevalent standpoint privileges constituted power over constituent
power.2 The discussion of Kelsen and Schmitt offered in this book (40ff) is much too
perfunctory to do justice to the problem of constituent power precisely because what
Kelsen and Schmitt, in combination, managed to do was to inscribe the problem and
meaning of democracy within constitutionalism, where it has remained ever since then,
even in those theorists who seek to criticize them by recovering constituent power in its
‘purity’.3 Put another way, there is in Balibar’s concept of citizenship a failure to capture
the revolutionary potential immanent to constitutionalism itself, for Balibar tends to
assume that a people is “autonomous,” i.e., capable of giving itself a constitution,
independently of constitutional principles and rules.4
The second serious problem with Balibar’s reading of politeia is the lack of
reflection on the problem of what makes something like a “citizen” possible in the first
place. As argued by such distinct thinkers as Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt, Alexandre Kojève,
and Michel Foucault—all of whom draw on intuitions derived from Nietzsche—behind
and before the possibility of citizenship stands a conception of nomos that has pastoralphilosophical origins because it refers to a way of concentrating and distributing in a
concrete normative order a population or “herd” in such a way that they develop an “ethics”
or a reflexive conduct. Such nomoi, of course, do not fall from trees, but are the theologicopolitical creations of nomothetes or lawgivers and to which correspond the idea of a
“natural right” or physikon nomos, an idea that receives no discussion in this book.5
The lack of reflection on the idea of nomos affects Balibar’s own appropriation of
Arendt’s formula of the “right to have rights” for the sake of developing his notion of
insurrectionary citizenship. Like Arendt herself, Balibar seeks to link such a basic right
both to the “Rights of Man” or universal human rights and to an idea of constituent power.
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However, unlike Arendt, Balibar interprets such a “right to have rights” as a “right to
politics” in the sense of “the possibility of not being excluded from the right to fight for
one’s rights” (66), or in terms of an “active” idea of citizenship conceived “as a form of
participation that already manifests itself in demands for access (or belonging)” (75). This
reading of the formula—which prioritizes politics over law—has been quite influential in
some recent theorization of human rights (for example, those of James Ingram and Ayten
Gündoğdu), but it tends to fatally downplay the ineluctably juridical and systematic
dimension of any discourse of rights, including one on the right to have rights, which owes
much more, evidently, to the Kantian idea of a single innate right to freedom, to Kelsen’s
basic norm, or to Hart’s version of the same idea, than it does to social struggles for political
recognition.
Balibar’s way of reading rights as instruments for a struggle for inclusion into
citizenship reflects the priority of the problem of exclusion, to which he dedicates the
central part of the book. Balibar is aware, of course, that citizenship as a status of “beingin-common” and of inclusion into a community presupposes also the possibility of an
“internal exclusion” or conversely reflects “the constitution of an exclusive community”
(70). “It is always citizens, ‘knowing’ and ‘imagining’ themselves as such, who exclude
from citizenship and who, thus, ‘produce’ non-citizens in such a way as to make it possible
for them to represent their own citizenship to themselves as a ‘common’ belonging” (76).
If one asks why modern citizenship is constructed as a mechanism that includes in order to
exclude, Balibar points to the dualism between Man and Citizen of modern natural right
(79–80), where being “human” is not only a guarantee of access to citizenship (as was
intended by the Enlightenment) but also permits

“the transformation of general

anthropological differences (differences of gender, differences of age, differences between
normal and pathological, etc.)

into principles of exclusion… the transcendental

universality of the species and the discriminating and discriminatory functions of
anthropological differences are not incompatible; they form two faces of the same
discourse” (80). But this claim is more descriptive than explicatory unless one identifies a
discourse and a technology that simultaneously politicizes the “natural” human being and
deprives it of political power. To explain this phenomenon Foucault, followed more
recently by Agamben, develops over thousand pages and more than a decade an analytic
of disciplinary and biopower and a genealogy of governmentality centered on the category
of “civil society”: Balibar dedicates less than a page to Foucault, and one meagre footnote
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to Agamben. It is fair to say that his style of critical theory has not crossed over the
biopolitical threshold.
Balibar ends Citizenship by confronting his standpoint with Wendy Brown’s
influential theses on neoliberalism, which are heavily influenced by Foucault’s work on
governmentality. For Brown, neoliberalism effects the permanent separation of liberalism
from democracy, losing entirely the horizon of what Balibar calls the “constitution of
citizenship.” Balibar is less pessimistic about neoliberalism, which for him merely
represents the latest episode of a transhistorical tension and oscillation between
insurrection and constitution. On this view, neoliberalism is but a perfected attempt to do
away with the conflict and struggle around citizenship “by means of rules that force it to
contribute to a consensus, or to ‘translate’ itself into an exchange of arguments” and that
in so doing “exclude anything that, in a given society, carries true political stakes: liberation
struggles, emancipatory demands, revolts against injustice and inequality” (92). The
impossibility of excluding struggle in this fashion is ultimately why Balibar turns to a
theory of violence in order to understand modern politics, as I discuss next.
However, in Citizenship, Balibar’s thesis is that democracy or insurrection is
always “a regime of illegitimate power” (93) precisely because it questions those rules that
“legitimate” power. The exemplar of such democratic “illegitimacy” is found in
Machiavelli’s conception of the people as desiring “not to be dominated” and to the
“anarchic” conception of citizenship that it gives rise to (95), and gets expressed in the
asymmetric conflict between the poles of insurrection and constitution, which conflict is
“endless” and “incessant” because it can never find a definitive constitutional solution or
form (99–100). Ultimately, Balibar’s response to Brown is entirely neo-Machiavellian, i.e.,
based on the claim of the productivity of the conflict between demands for no-rule and
demands for legitimate rule in any political regime. From this basis there follow Balibar’s
concluding propositions: that democracy is tied to “events” of insurrection more than to
constitutional “forms”; that democracy is about transgressing institutional limits (here
Balibar cites Lefort) in order to articulate “new fundamental rights” and establishing the
“commons” (124); and, finally, that “democratic inventions” makes for a new “experience
of democratic citizenship.”6
The second book under discussion, Violence and Civility, is a reworked and
somewhat updated version of a series of lectures that Balibar originally gave about 20 years
ago. The theme of the lectures is the relation of politics to violence. Balibar starts from the
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general Weberian idea that what distinguishes politics from other activities is the legitimate
use of violence. Balibar turns this definition into a paradox of sorts: just as there is no
politics if there is no employment of violent means, so too there is no politics unless a form
of “anti-violence” is developed. To analyze this knot is the task of the lectures. Balibar
begins by sketching two general solutions to the paradox given in the modern tradition of
political thought, which consists in employing legitimate violence as a “counter-violence”
to illegitimate violence. In the Hobbesian model, counter-violence takes the form of a
sovereign exclusion of violence from civil society by threatening those who intend to be
violent with an overwhelming form of violence, i.e., the state as Leviathan. In the Hegelian
model, instead, the use of violence within politics can become legitimate as long as it is
“convertible” into an institutional form, viz. in the form of struggles for recognition.
Balibar puts forward two theses: first, he argues that there always remains some aspect of
violence that is “inconvertible” by political and social institutions and their counterviolence; second, that there exists a specific conception of “the political” which consists in
making possible an “anti-violence” understood as “a whole set of political strategies… that
respond to the fact of violence” and which Balibar calls “civility” (65).
According to Balibar, there are two kinds of violence that are not “convertible”
by state institutions. The first he calls “ultraobjective violence” and it refers, essentially, to
the violence exerted through discourses of racism and directed against those populations
that cannot be included into citizenship and are “let die” (69). The second he calls
“ultrasubjective violence” because it is tied to violence employed to stabilize a sense of
homogeneous and substantive identity under conditions of what we would call today
“multiculturalism.” Both “inconvertible” kinds of violence flow into one another. Balibar
identifies two sources for this violence that cannot be domesticated by normal political or
constitutional means. The first one is associated with state sovereignty “which defines itself
as an internal excess over legal power, appears to be inseparable from cruelty because it
must always remedy its own defect, whether on the side of the law itself or on that of the
people” (80). Sovereignty gives rise to a “demand for preferential violence (against
foreigners, nomads, and so on) that allows moderns states to compensate for the gradual
crumbling of their sovereignty”: perhaps something that today we could identify with
Trump’s “Muslim ban” executive orders. They take the form of a “preventive
counterviolence” against presumed “internal enemies.”
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The other source of ultraobjective violence is colonialism (80). Here Balibar’s
reasoning becomes quite contorted and confusing since he approaches colonial violence
through a quick reading of Marx’s first volume of Capital and its idea of “structural
violence” (83). This “violence” is in evidence, according to Balibar, in the disjunction
between the treatment of the worker as a person when selling his or her labor force and the
treatment of the worker as a thing once his or her labor force is set in capitalist relations of
productions (84). This contradiction, according to Balibar, receives in Marx’s discourse at
least three different possible resolutions: either the worker’s struggle for dignity in the
workplace is employed to strengthen and “civilize” capitalism; or it leads to a communist
overthrow of capitalist forms of production; or, last and most important for Balibar, the
contradiction between person and thing “periodically revives the violent forms of
‘primitive accumulation’ opposed term for term to institutional regulation; but the form
that ‘primitive accumulation’ typically takes in the history of modern capitalism is
colonization, either ‘external’ or ‘internal’” (89–90). It is fairly clear that in his idea of
colonial violence Balibar is trying to connect the reification effected by capitalism with the
reduction of humanity to “bare life” that occurs in the modern construction of racial, ethnic,
and sexual apparatuses (what Agamben calls the “anthropological machine”), but it is
likewise obvious that Balibar again avoids adopting and employing precisely the one
critical discourse that would permit him to connect these two, namely, the one offered by
biopolitics.7 Furthermore, it is not at all clear how his notion of colonial violence relates to
the ultraobjective violence generated by the excesses of state sovereignty. At one point he
quickly refers to Foucault’s notion that modern state construction went hand in hand with
the development of a thanatopolitical discourse of war between races and classes whose
formula was the “defense of society” (76–77), but this fleeting reference is symptomatic of
the fact that Balibar’s analysis is begging for a biopolitical and thanatopolitical
development which never materializes.
The second part of the book is dedicated to sketching the “strategies of civility”
or antiviolence that should be employed to deal with the phenomenon of “inconvertible”
ultraobjective violence. Balibar wants to develop an idea of civility that is neither
Hobbesian nor Hegelian essentially because these models see the problem of violence in
an excess of politics over against its regulation either through sovereignty or through
institutions of (capitalist) civil society, whereas Balibar argues that only such a surplus of
politics (which he calls “civility”) can contrast the ultraobjective violence that is generated
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by sovereignty and capitalist society. Thus, Balibar proposes a two-step program against
the slide into colonialism and racism. First, those legal institutions that articulate the private
and the public need to be upheld (97–98) because they make politics possible, but “the
contribution of the institution to establishing a space for politics in which the forms of (self)
destructive extreme violence are—if only temporarily—ruled out is thus itself
conditional… to a second degree of ‘politicity’ at once immanent and heterogenous: the
degree, precisely, that I am hypothetically calling ‘civility’” (99). The second step consists
in the dynamic of citizenship, namely, in remaining open to “the conflict between the
tendency (on the part of a class, a caste, a bureaucracy, or an apparatus) to monopolize
power, and the tendency of citizenship as the concrete conquest of freedom and equality”
(99). Again, Balibar’s position seems paradoxical: if citizenship in the national, capitalist
modern state is complicit in the generation of ultraviolence, then the solution is… more
and different citizenship!
Balibar identifies three variants of “civility” or enhanced citizenship, which he
calls “the ‘politics’ at heart of politics itself” (106). The first consists in a “return to
Hegel… to his doctrine of Sittlichkeit” or the “hegemonic strategy” (107); the second
consists in the “majoritarian strategy” associated with Marxism as a project of collective
emancipation (107); the third consists in a process of “becoming-minoritarian of
minorities” and is associated to the names of Deleuze and Guattari (108). Perhaps it is
worth spending a moment on the first strategy, the return to Hegel, since it is the same
strategy recommended by Honneth, whose theory I discuss next. Balibar seems to think
that Hegel’s conception of civility as Sittlichkeit offers the possibility of countering
biopolitical ultraviolence because it is constitutive of an identification in citizens as
members of “secondary communities that are neither ‘natural’ nor ‘political’ but precisely
social, offering a kind of affiliation or belonging halfway between constraint and freedom”
(111). These communities (family, civil society, state) offer the possibility for the
individual to attain its political identity as an “undifferentiated affiliation, egalitarian and
universalist” to a state that is no longer absolute but internally differentiated and pluralistic
(112). Clearly, Balibar intends this Hegelian strategy of civility through identification to
be balanced by Marxist and Deleuzian strategies of “disidentification.” At one point
Balibar tantalizing alludes to the connection between Hegelian Sittlichkeit, the “tragic” idea
of the family found in Hegel’s reading of Antigone, and the importance of “normalization”
in the Foucaultian sense of the term (114). What Balibar means remains undecipherable,
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but I take it he must be referring to the phenomenon that Hegel called the “tragedy of
Sittlichkeit” as definitive for modern civil society.8 Indeed, the last sentence of the book
seems to give the last word to tragedy, to an impossible synthesis of identity and difference:
“the central question is still that of the concept of identification and its other face,
èdisidentification, torn between the diverse modalities of the tragic: as sacrifice (or
sacrifice of sacrifice), as heroism without ‘hope’ [Gramsci], or as game of metamorphosis
in search of its own rules [Deleuze and Foucault]” (126).
The way in which Balibar understands civility as both a return and a critique of
Hegelian Sittlichkeit, as both a need for identification (recognition) and disidentification
(conflict and disagreement) brings me to the last book under review, Recognition or
Disagreement, which, as it were, takes these two moments in their purity and stages a nondialectical confrontation between Honneth and Rancière. Both thinkers agree on only one
thing, namely, that they seek to show how rebellion or insurrection is possible (102), so in
that sense they stand in agreement with Balibar’s positioning of insurrection as crucial.
However, I shall argue that in the end Rancière and Honneth are both more “dialectical”
than Balibar in the sense that insurrection is for both of them a possibility that is internal
to a constitutional order, not external to it.
Recognition or Disagreement is actually composed of three distinct moments: two
introductions by the editors that frame the exchange; the exchange itself; and two texts in
which each author presents what is exemplary of their standpoint. The three parts do not
make a harmonious whole, but nonetheless their sum makes this a very useful book that
serves as a good introduction to the later period in the trajectory of both thinkers, and offers
a clear presentation of one of the crucial paradigms in contemporary European political
theory, namely, the paradigm of recognition. In general, one can say the following: whereas
the introductions are meant to set the stage for the encounter and, thus, seek to frame it as
a debate internal to the paradigm of recognition, the actual exchange between Rancière and
Honneth stages precisely a lack of recognition and an undialectical opposition between the
two standpoints. However, the separate individual essays, if read carefully, do give room
for some commonality, but one that has nothing to do with recognition.
The editors of the book try to justify why Rancière and Honneth both belong to
the tradition of critical theory. For Katia Genel, critical theory is about employing theory
toward the aim of emancipation. In turn, the basic principles under which claims to
emancipation can be formulated are those of equality and liberty, represented by Rancière
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and Honneth respectively. How these thinkers conceive of each concept is found in their
individual essays. But the point of the exchange is to see whether the two principles can be
reconciled or not. This is where the second introducer, Jean-Philippe Deranty, comes into
the fray with a very long and demanding essay, by far the longest piece of writing in the
book.
Deranty defends the strong thesis that “the language of recognition” is the sine
qua non of critical theory. 9 Deranty believes he can subsume both positions within a
general discourse regarding the struggle for recognition. He claims to have identified a
“Rancièrian theory of recognition” (36) which would confirm the “in-principle agreement”
between Rancière and Honneth. A paradigmatic case of “mésentente” (or dis-agreement)
is the plebeian secession from Rome, of which Rancière says that it constitutes “a revolt
that is to be identified with the capacity to recognize oneself as a speaking subject and to
give oneself a name” (cited on 38). Deranty argues this way of understanding insurrection
places Rancière very close to Honneth’s early work on how proletarian class struggles are
“struggles for dignity” (38). Referring to Rancière’s own early studies on proletarian
struggles in the nineteenth century, Deranty finds a place where Rancière speaks of the
worker’s “desire to be recognized,” which Deranty then renders “as a struggle for the
recognition of proletarian identity” (38). As can be seen, the textual basis for Deranty’s
claim of an “in-principle agreement” between the two authors with respect to recognition
is rather slim.
Unlike Honneth, for whom the struggle of recognition is intended to “guarantee
the possibility of a good relationship to oneself” (Katia Grenel, 24), Rancière forcefully
rejects any such identity as the telos of such struggles, and so the question becomes whether
such struggles could be properly termed struggles for “recognition” at all. For him, the
purpose of the insurrectionary struggle is not the recognition of a proper, non-pathological
or distorted identity, but to effect a break or fracture with the given “partition of the
sensible,” so as to construct a different “world” in which recognition between the old and
the new world is no longer an issue because impossible. Deranty, instead, thinks that for
Rancière “the heart of emancipatory politics is the struggle for the recognition of one’s
capacity to take part in dissensual, polemical conflicts over specific social objects” (39). In
my opinion this misconstrues of Rancière’s position: Rancière is not saying that the plebs
want to be included in the Roman patrician order, so as to be able to “legitimately” express
their disagreement with such order and thus fight for more equality with the patricians;
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rather, for Rancière the plebs are struggling to break from such an order of partition that
identifies them as plebeians, and they do so on the basis of an idea of equality of everyone
with everyone that is found in no order or partition of the sensible (but for all that is also
not a “natural” equality).
The second portion of Deranty’s essay addresses the question of the “subjectconcept” at work in Rancière and Honneth, and whether there is a possible bridge between
the former’s emphasis on subjectivity as des-identification and the latter’s seemingly
opposite emphasis on subjectivity as achieved (recognized) identification. For Deranty,
“Rancière’s criticism is immanent to the problem of recognition: grounding the model of
recognition in the norms of personal identity makes the very project of recognition politics
untenable” (42). Instead, Deranty thinks that in Rancière the struggle for recognition is not
a struggle for a “stable identity” but “struggles for a new configuration of the common
world in which the particular bodies, voices, sites, objects which so far have been excluded
from the realm of collective deliberation become sites and objects for such deliberation”
(42). Once again, this seems to fly in the face of Rancière’s point, namely, that the struggle
which characterizes dis-agreement or mèsentente is precisely one that is premised on the
non-existence of a “common world” in which “collective deliberation” could meaningfully
take place. For Rancière the social world is always split or partitioned, and dis-agreement
is not about constructing a non-divided world, as he explains at length in the essay included
in the book, but rather more akin to the invention of (parallel) “universes” (see Rancière’s
reference to “different universes” in 122 and to the human being as “literary animal” in
143–46).
Interestingly, I think that Deranty’s decision to base the comparison on a
discussion of the “subject-concept” again fails him when it comes time to reconstruct
Honneth’s standpoint. Deranty claims that for the late Honneth “in order to reach individual
aims that realize key dimensions of their autonomy, each social subject has to assume that
there are others who share with him similar normative attitude, so that it is only by
recognizing one another in that capacity that these interlocked individual goals can be
realized” (45). I think this description of recognition misses the point of Honneth’s turn to
objective freedom associated with institutions. Deranty gives an instrumental view of such
institutions as defining “modes of social behaviour and social roles which, when endorsed
by subjects, allow them to engage in the kind of social action that makes possible
realization of their goals” (45). But Honneth’s (and Hegel’s) point about objective freedom
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is not simply the fact that, given modern capitalist conditions, if I want to satisfy my needs,
I need to make money through wages, and thus have to enter the labor market constituted
by a series of normative expectations, etc. etc. The point that Honneth seems to be after is
closer to what Marx meant by the “real subsumption” of use value with exchange value in
advanced capitalism, namely, that what it means for me to “satisfy my needs” is already
determined by the fact that I can only produce within a capitalist mode of production.
Modes of production, just like Hegelian Sittlichkeit, are not the resultant of a social contract
between individual wills: natural right is finished on the views of Hegel and Marx. In short,
there is no “outside” of institutions for the individual. In so far as Honneth shares this view,
this seems to me the most important point of his late work. For Deranty, instead, Honneth’s
shift towards an institutional or objective idea of freedom leaves behind his earlier
psychological or anthropological understanding of recognition and thus leaves no space for
“the phenomenology of social suffering…. The phenomenology of unjust or exploitative
or alienating work practices” (47). This may be so, but I think that the more pressing
problem for Honneth is whether there is space left for a theory of the legitimacy of
institutions other than as medium for individual self-realization. If it is the case, as Deranty
argues, that for Honneth justice simply means “the universal ideal condition allowing for
the flourishing of each and every person” (60) then Honneth would have fallen below the
Rawlsian required threshold of a “political, not metaphysical” conception of justice. I am
not clear whether Honneth’s statement that “principles dictate how to recognize one
another and, in that sense, they legitimate a certain political order” gets the point of the
distinction between principles of legitimacy and principles of justice.
Conversely, Deranty praises Rancière’s later emphasis on “the somatic and the
prediscursive” or “the flesh” (53), as well as his “aesthetic” conception of the police as a
function of the distribution of bodies in space, because it comes closer to the
“phenomenological” approach he advocates. However, it is striking that only in the last
two pages (79–80) is there the briefest of mentions of Foucault’s (and Agamben’s)
discourses on biopolitics and governmentality, which would seem to be not only the source
for Ranciere’s notion of police, but also the obvious place to look for the sought after
“phenomenological” conception of “flesh” and its relation to power (53ff).
The last part of Deranty’s introductory essay turns on which principle functions
best as “foundational norm” for critical theory: autonomy (Honneth) or equality (Rancière).
Deranty says that in Honneth the concepts of identity, integrity, autonomy, and freedom as
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self-realization all mean the same thing, and that they are in principle distinct from equality.
The perfectionist conception of self-realization in Honneth (56), according to Deranty, is
“defined by reference to the telos of a state of unhindered individual flourishing resulting
from ideal supporting social conditions” (59). On this view, equality refers simply to the
“notion that all members of modern societies are equally entitled to freedom” (58) but does
not determine the meaning of freedom. Similarly, Honneth criticizes liberal egalitarian
conceptions of justice on the grounds that the equal distribution of some relevant good is
secondary with respect to justice as “equal access to the conditions of self-realization”
which conditions are social and institutional at once (59). Deranty himself criticizes
Honneth’s deficit with respect to egalitarianism because it downplays a “socialontological” idea of redistributive justice understood as “the demand expressed by each
and every person that they should receive what they are due and should give to others only
what others are due” (63). Here Deranty seems to be appealing to a conception of natural
right that is probably irreconcilable with Honneth’s conception of objective viz.
institutional freedom.
Deranty’s discussion of equality in Rancière seems to be likewise derived from
natural right doctrine insofar as he takes Rancière to uphold an “ontological equality of
anyone with anyone… the universal feature of being human” (66) which is frustrated in
any given “differential, hierarchical treatment” established by the “order of police” (67,
71). It follows from this reconstruction, that for Rancière what defines politics—as opposed
to police—is the struggle “not over a specific form of social injustice, but rather at the
second-order level of the capacity of subjects to be heard about that injustice” (51). For
Deranty, this emphasis on communication brings Rancière close to the standpoint of
Nancy Fraser and Rainer Forst, for the former makes “participatory parity” the “core norm
of critical theory” and the latter argues that the “point of justice…is the right of individuals
to have their voices count as expressions of reason and is, as a result, their demand to be
treated as agents to whom reasons are due” (52). At this point, something must have gone
very askew in the interpretation of Rancière’s notion of mésentente for Deranty has entirely
thrown overboard the radical difference that Rancière assigns to practices of dissensus
over those of consensus. It is simply mistaken to claim that “politics in Disagreement is a
battle of justifications, mainly a battle for what counts as justification and who is entitled
to proffer and expect justifications” (54) precisely because such a decision, if it were to be
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legitimate, would presuppose the common world and common deliberation that Rancière’s
theory argues is literally impossible given the existence of politics.
For Rancière, legitimate domination works though the consensus of all those in a
social order as to who can (who is capacitated to) do what: this is the “distribution of the
sensible” of the order of police. It refers to what above I designated as the conception of
“real subsumption” of all aspects of society within a capitalist process because it depends
on any given individual really believing that he or she has the capacity assigned to him or
her by that social order on pain of not being able to reproduce their own life. This situation
is what Rancière calls the “wrong done by all forms of inclusion in terms of identity” (92).
For him, politics happens when an individual or a group of individuals realize that they are
also endowed with the “capacity of anybody,” which is in turn based on the premise that
“intelligence is the same in all its operations and it belongs to everybody” (139). Making
use of this anonymous capacity is the activity of dissensus or disagreement (139–41).
Now, for Rancière, to make use of the “capacity of anybody” is to “act as artists
who make exist in a new configuration what doesn’t exist in the present configuration. The
key point is that they do not enact it as their capacity… but as the capacity possessed by
those to which this capacity is denied in general” (93). I think that Rancière’s fundamental
point is that dissensus is not external to a given police order because “the society of
inequality itself could not work without that capacity. Inequality has to presuppose
equality. At the same time, it has to deny it” (93). In other words, the capacity of “selfinvention” or “dis-identification” is the only properly social capacity, shared by everyone
but recognized by none—that is why every police order, to the extent that it is a social
order, depends on it. Precisely because dissensus is, paradoxically, a purely social (not
individual) phenomenon, Rancière can say that “a political subject is an invention; an
invention has no self… it’s the question of the construction of different universes” (122).
It is evident that something like Forst’s “right to justification,” that is, the requirement that
the social position of anyone be justified to them in an exchange of mutually acceptable
reasons has little to do with the theory of social intelligence defended by Rancière, but falls
squarely on the side of consensus-building. However, Balibar’s idea of citizenship as an
“open office” (aoristos arche) capable of being held by “anyone” does come close to
Rancière’s “presupposition of a competence of those who have no specific competence, a
competence that is shared by everybody” (112). But the difference with Balibar is that for
Rancière “to the extent that it is political, a social order has to include in some place, in
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some respect, this power of those who have no power, this power of those who are not
included,” whereas for Balibar social institutions are, so to speak, more exclusionary of
this power and thus give way to what he calls the dialectic between insurrection and
constitution.
Honneth misunderstands Rancière’s point about the possibility of politics being
always already included in any social order of police. That is why he opposes to Rancière
his own idea of politics as an “internal struggle for recognition” in which individuals and
groups reinterpret the legitimating principles of a given police order from the inside in
order to make it more inclusive, in the sense of permitting the self-realization of more
people (105, 109). In reality, both give an “internalist” idea of insurrection that is at odds
with the natural right interpretation given by Deranty. In Honneth’s essay this comes out
explicitly when he defends Hegel’s “objective” idea of freedom, by which he refers to the
phenomenon that in modernity “social institutions themselves are now considered as
making possible the realization of freedom in the external domain of social action” (161).
Honneth turns to Hegel’s institutional idea of freedom to criticize liberal ideas of individual
freedom, either as non-interference or as rational self-determination (163), in both cases
the other’s freedom functions as an external limit to my freedom. If this were the case, then
institutional arrangements could only be instrumental ones, and all social relations the
product of contractual relations, which in many ways is the dream that neoliberalism has
attempted to realize.
Honneth manages to capture the basic republican idea of Hegel according to
which individual freedom is only possibly in a free state because it is only free institutions
that ultimately can teach individuals how to be “rationally self-determined” (168). The
basic point is that freedom in Hegel is no longer tied to the exercise of the subjective or
individual will (and thus no longer tied to the consensus with other subjective wills
achieved in the form of contract) but is itself a characteristic of institutions for only within
and through “institutionalized practices” is the” kind of self-relation possible” (167) that
leads to “an undistorted and complete self-relationship” (110). In this sense, I think that
Rancière’s critique of Honneth for being too attached to “identity” misunderstands the
Hegelian idea of objective freedom that requires the total self-alienation of the “individual”
at least as much as Rancière’s conception of the “capacity of anybody.” But Honneth’s
neo-Hegelian point about modern Sittlichkeit was already made by Foucault in his studies
of liberal governmentality: institutions in modernity are legitimate only to the extent that

Citizenship, Insurrection, and Recognition

75

they “liberate” or “make free.” Except that Foucault understands this Hegelian point in
biopolitical terms: institutions generate this freedom of individuals only in and through
security dispositifs and “technologies of self.” Any theory of recognition that does not
account for this internal relation between modern freedom and security is falling short of
reality.
Ultimately, it is unclear whether Honneth has the nerve to hold onto Hegel’s
leading thought in its purity. Towards the end of his essay, he distances himself from the
conservative nature of Hegel’s conclusions and claims that it is possible to return to the
categories of abstract right and of morality, i.e., to negative forms of liberty, in order to
gain “exit” from the very dynamics of Sittlichkeit through which individuals gain “voice”
(174). This seems to be Honneth’s liberal “bad conscience” speaking, a recalcitrant piece
of natural right. Last but not least, Honneth waxes lyrical when he claims that the
institutions of Sittlichkeit (family, market, state) manage to eliminate all residual “natural”
conceptions of freedom from society (171). But this cannot be the case if, as Hegel
maintains, the state itself remains in a state of nature with respect to other states. Not to
speak of the all too biopolitical determinants of family and market institutions that Hegel
was all too aware of (witness his reading of Antigone, the problem of colonialism, etc.) and
that Marx would exploit systematically in his critique of Hegel.10 In this sense, Balibar’s
however vague gesticulations towards the need to provide a biopolitical reading of
Sittlichkeit should be warmly taken up by Honneth and other theorists of recognition.
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